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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, an independent judicial system enjoying
the confidence of the citizenry is central to preserving the rule of
law. The rule of law, in turn, is the bedrock of both our federal and
state judicial systems. I will mention several challenges to the
independence of the Judiciary that are operative today and seem, to
me at least, to be particularly troubling. I will also talk about some
fundamental changes that are occurring in the federal district and
appellate courts.
During the nearly seven years that I have been Chief Judge of
the Fifth Circuit and a member of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, I have been privileged to have a ring side seat on the
relations among the three branches of government and particularly
on the effects of the political branches on the federal judiciary. I
would like to talk about that, beginning with money and moving on
to even more important aspects of judicial independence.
I. POLITICAL CHALLENGES
A. Governance and Financing of the Judiciary
First, for background information, let me tell you how the
federal judiciary is governed and financed. The federal judiciary is
governed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, which is
chaired by the Chief Justice of the United States and composed of
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the chief judge from every judicial circuit, a district judge
representative from every circuit, and the chief judges of the
Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade-twenty-
seven members in all. It meets twice a year, in September and
March. Its function is to set the policies by which the Judiciary is
governed. Those policies are developed in the first instance by
committees of the Judicial Conference composed of circuit,
district, magistrate, and bankruptcy judges. Each committee has a
specific area of responsibility, for example, the budget, criminal
law, information technology, judicial resources, security, space and
facilities, and the rules of practice and procedure. The committees
meet twice a year and forward to the Judicial Conference
recommendations on policies to be adopted by the Conference.
The Executive Committee, which I chaired, helps develop the
agenda for the Judicial Conference sessions, acts on behalf of the
Conference on emergency matters, and adopts the spending plan
for the Judiciary shortly before the beginning of each fiscal year.
The Constitution mandates that the powers of the federal
government be separated among three independent branches:
executive, legislative and judicial. But the Judiciary is financed,
like all other parts of the federal government, through
appropriations bills passed by Congress and signed by the
President. You have heard that the Judiciary does not have the
power of the purse. Indeed, it does not; it is dependent for its
financial livelihood on Congress and the President. So our
independence must always be understood as qualified by our
dependence on the other branches for our money. Each year we
receive four separate appropriations, which in fiscal 2005 totaled
approximately $5.42 billion.2 Our principal appropriation is for
our Salaries and Expenses account, from which most of our bills
are paid.
For many years, our appropriations were adequate to cover not
only our existing levels of operations but also the additional
manpower, space, and equipment that the ever increasing caseloads
required. But beginning about the time of the disappearance of the
1. See U.S. Const. arts. I, II, & III.
2. U.S. Courts, Judiciary Budget Facts and Impact, http://www.uscourts.
gov/judiciary2005.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
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federal budget surplus and the advent of soaring federal budget
deficits, the size of the increase in our appropriations over the
amounts we received in the prior year began to diminish sharply.
Specifically, in the year 2000, when times were good, we received
a 9.9% increase in our Salaries and Expenses appropriation over
the corresponding 1999 appropriation.3 That percentage increase
over the prior year diminished to 7.6% in 2001, 7.2% in 2002,
4.8% in 2003, 4.7% in 2004, and 4.3% in 2005, not a good trend,
to say the least.4 For fiscal 2004, in which we received the 4.7%
increase over the preceding year, we actually needed an increase of
over 6% simply to maintain current staff and services, and an
increase of 11% to fully fund our increased workload. 5 The result
of the shortfall was that we lost 1,350 staff positions, or 6% of our
court staff.
6
The Judiciary's financial problems are based not only on the
declining level of our appropriations but also on the fact that 84%
of our expenses consist of two items over which we have little
control in the near term. The first of these is the rent which, under
federal law, we must pay to the General Services Administration
(GSA) for our courthouses and other buildings. In fiscal 2005 that
rent, which is a first charge against our appropriation, totaled 22%
of our Salaries and Expenses appropriation.7 Our personnel costs,
which are the other item over which we have little control in the
near term, totaled 62% of our Salaries and Expenses appropriation
in fiscal 2005.8 Our rent has been increasing at the rate of 7% to
7.5% per year, partly as a result of escalation clauses in our leases
with the GSA and partly as a result of the addition of new space.
Our personnel costs have been increasing at a rate slightly in
excess of 6% per year as a result of generous cost-of-living
adjustments and pay policies that are government-wide. So, to
3. Report of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Cost-Containment Strategy for the Federal Judiciary: 2005 and
Beyond (August 12, 2004) [hereinafter Report]. Report was approved by the
Judicial Conference of the United States on September 21, 2004.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3-4.
6. 2004 End-Year Report on the Federal Judiciary (2004), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf.
7. Report, supra note 3, at 1.
8. Id.
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sum up the problem, when your appropriation is increasing at the
rate of approximately 4.5% per year but 84% of your expenses are
increasing at rates between 6% and 7.5% per year, you have a
terrible financial problem.
In September 2004, recognizing that the federal judiciary faces
unprecedented funding challenges in the coming years because of
the fiscal constraints that Congress faces, the Judicial Conference
adopted a major cost containment strategy. We looked at every
major component of our expenses, and devised a plan that over the
next few years will, if implemented faithfully, substantially reduce
the gap between our appropriations and our expenses. But a
couple of major components of that plan, including a new
compensation policy, remain to be fully developed, and it will take
sustained discipline to fully implement the plan over the next few
years. Even if we are faithful to the plan, however, there will still
be shortfalls, smaller ones to be sure, unless our appropriations
improve. Those shortfalls have to come principally out of staffing
levels because that is the only major component of our expenses
that is flexible. Any threat to our staffing levels is serious; we
cannot absorb further staff cuts of any size without real damage to
our operations.
It is not only the Third Branch that faces the possibility of
substantial budget cuts in the years ahead; all government agencies
face the same possibility. But the Judiciary is in a somewhat
different position than the ordinary government agency. Most
government agencies manage a large number of programs. In such
a case, if the budget is cut, the agency can trim back or sometimes
even eliminate some of its programs. The Judiciary does not have
programs. It has only two lines of work, both reactive. We take in
cases filed by others under jurisdictional grants established by
Congress, work on those cases, finish them up, and send them out
the door. If the cases we take in happen to be criminal cases and
the defendants are indigent, we appoint and pay counsel as the
Constitution requires. And at the other end of the system, we
supervise felons released from the federal prison system. We do
not have the option of trimming back our work.
Our appropriations committees in both the Senate and the
House understand our unique plight and have been uncommonly
sympathetic. Do not forget that we did receive increases in our
664 [Vol. 66
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appropriations, albeit not as large as we needed, when some other
government agencies received cuts. But, in the end, understanding
and sympathy will not be enough to carry the day; it comes down
to how many dollars our appropriators have to appropriate. The
size of the federal deficit is the core problem. As long as it
continues, our situation will be at the least very difficult, and if we
are forced to make more layoffs, it could be disastrous.
B. Attacks on the Judiciary
Thus far, I have addressed the challenge to judicial
independence that comes from how we are financed. This
particular challenge is, at least, one provided for in the
Constitution. I will move now to other challenges to our
independence that run counter to what the Constitution
contemplates. Justice Stephen Breyer has framed the issue. He
said: the "question of judicial independence revolves around the
theme of how to assure that judges decide according to law, rather
than according to their own whims or to the will of the political
branches of government." 9 As Professor Dennis Hutchinson of the
University of Chicago has pointed out, Breyer's succinct formula
contains at least two premises. "First, the judicial independence is
not an end in itself but is an instrument in service of the rule of
law. Second . . . 'judges free from executive and legislature
control will be in a position to determine whether the assertion of
power against the citizen is consistent with law." ' 10 Keeping those
premises for judicial independence in mind, let us look at how well
the Judiciary has fared with members of the House and Senate
other than our appropriators.
What we see is that the independence of the Judiciary is being
challenged by the unprecedented attacks being leveled at both the
state and federal judiciaries. These attacks emanate from members
of both houses, especially House members from Texas, and they
emanate also from various other interest groups, particularly some
9. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 St.
Louis U. L.J. 989, 989 (1996).
10. Dennis J. Hutchinson, History of Attacks on Judicial Independence,
presented at Workshop for Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit (October 6, 2005) (on file with author).
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fundamentalist religious groups. They are triggered most often by
judicial decisions, such as the Schiavo case, the Ten
Commandments cases, and the recent eminent domain cases. After
the courts decided not to intervene in the Schiavo case, House
majority leader Tom DeLay warned that the judges would have to
"answer for their behavior" in a court system "run amok."'"
Shortly after Judge Lefkow's husband and mother were murdered
and the violence that occurred in a state courthouse in Georgia,
Senator Comyn took to the Senate floor to suggest some vague
connection between the deranged murderers responsible for
"recent episodes of courthouse violence" and "judicial activism." 12
To his credit, he subsequently backed off of that. Although a few
called for impeachment of judges responsible for the controversial
decisions, Representative James Sensenbrenner, Chair of the
House Judiciary Committee, rejected the notion that Congress
should respond to cases such as the Schiavo matter by attempting
to neuter the courts through the impeachment of judges. But even
in rejecting impeachment, he warned ominously, "This does not
mean that judges should not be punished in some capacity for
behavior that does not rise to the level of impeachable conduct."'13
He reserved the right to tinker with the courts' jurisdiction. And
he proposed the creation of an inspector general within the
Judiciary. Other Congressmen have suggested that the way to rein
in the courts is to starve them, raising the specter that further
constraints on our budget would be the pay-back for controversial
decisions.
C. The Appointment Process
The independence of the Judiciary is also being undermined by
the process by which federal appellate judges are appointed, a
process that involves both the executive and legislative branches. I
understand that the judicial appointment process has always been
political, but to varying degrees and with varying results on the
11. Editorial, Republicans Need to Cool Court Tactics, N.Y. Daily News,
May 1, 2005 (on file with author).
12. Angry at Rulings, Some Judge the Judges, ABC News, May 1, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/LegalCenter/story?id= 102839 1&page= I (last
visited Mar. 5, 2006) (on file with author).
13. Clarity for the Judiciary, Wash. Post, May 11, 2005, at A16.
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process itself and on the choice of appointees. I am a fourth-
generation Republican, appointed by a Democratic President who
specifically said that he did not care what my politics were. But,
admittedly, that was unusual. Recognizing that the Republican
administrations in the last twenty-five years may well not have
been unique, it seems to me that they have featured an ever
increasing demand by the President and his supporters for
candidates for the intermediate appellate courts with strong
conservative political views who can be relied upon to be
rigorously faithful to those views. That is not to say that every
federal appellate judge appointed by those administrations fits that
description because many do not. But it is to say that increasingly,
the common perception of what it takes to receive a judicial
appointment is fidelity to strongly held political views. In a recent
issue of the ABA Journal, the Chief Justice of the Utah Supreme
Court, Christine Durham, captured the problem well. She said:
"One of our concerns has to be about efforts, which are
widespread, to ensure and extract, either from sitting judges or
from candidates for judicial office, commitments that they will
decide cases in accord with a certain economic and political
agenda."'
14
What this selection process conveys to the public is the notion
that the Judiciary is yet another political branch of government, a
kind of stepchild of the other two branches. Judicial independence
is central to the separation of powers, and when the Judiciary is
perceived as a stepchild of the political branches of government,
the separation of the three branches of government is impaired.
This alters the public's perception of the role of the judge in a way
that is damaging to the judge's ability to say what the law is and
his authority or credibility in so doing. But, worse than that, it
bleeds back into the courts. Some judges begin to think, even
judges who have not been a part of the recent appointment process,
that fidelity to political views (whether conservative or liberal) is
an important part of their role, even if it simply takes the route of
countering some other judge's agenda. Instead of, or layered over,
14. Judges in the Culture Wars Crossfire: The 'Least Dangerous Branch' Is
Becoming the Most Vilified Branch; A High-Profile Panel Debates Whether the
Criticism Threatens Judicial Independence, 91 A.B.A. J. 44 (2005).
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a searching examination of what the law and the record teach about
a particular case is a commitment to push the law in one direction
or another.
There is a further complication to this scene that results when a
judge has ambition to move ahead, a normal human ambition
perhaps, but one that may present a moral hazard to a judge,
particularly in view of the of the current appointment process.
Every court of any size, district or appellate, has a judge who
wants to move ahead. Some courts have several. A few years ago,
I attended a symposium on judicial independence at Yale Law
School on alumni weekend that featured five federal judges who
had graduated from the same class at Yale. After the speakers had
made their presentations, comments from the floor were requested
and Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit, formerly the
Dean at Yale, popped up from the back row. He said that he had
only been on the Second Circuit for a few years, but that it was
long enough for him to conclude that the greatest threats to judicial
independence were judges with ambition. He said that many such
judges were real candidates for advancement only in their own
minds. Nevertheless, a judge with ambition constantly has his eye
on what the Administration or the Senate Judiciary Committee
would think about a decision under consideration and how the
decision would affect his chances for advancement. Such a judge
is sometimes inclined to give the law a push, to do the judicial
equivalent of putting his thumb on the scale. Some such judges go
around the country making speeches to various groups, including
well-known groups that seem to me to be to be judicial analogues
to political parties, about their views of the law. I recognize that
judges have First Amendment rights, but some of what I have read
comes dangerously close to the expression of views about cases
that may well come before them. Indeed, I fear it is intended to do
exactly that. And that is how the public would understand it,
further damaging public acceptance of, or commitment to, judicial
independence.
I must say that I was greatly heartened by the fact that the two
most recent nominees to the Supreme Court--Court of Appeals
Judge John Roberts, Jr. and White House Counsel Harriet Miers-
have not been on the speakers trail, and indeed, that may have been
a key factor in their nominations. But the howl that went up from
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some in the conservative camp upon the nomination of Harriet
Miers was telling. Tony Blankley, a conservative writer for The
Washington Times, said:
Of course, we conservatives were hoping for-and had
justifiable reasons to expect-that President Bush would
nominate any one of the many brilliant conservative legal
intellectuals who our movement has been carefully
nurturing and advancing these past 30 years. We raised
them from precocious pups. We gave them succor when
they presented themselves in the political jungle. We
advanced them carefully through the training grounds of
high office. And the deepness of their thoughts and the
deftness of their words made them beloved of the tribe.
And now this president, who we with our own millions of
arms raised on high, has spumed our best and chosen one
of his lackluster own ....
I would have vastly and justifiably preferred President
Bush to have chosen a certain, proven, intellectually
formidable legal warrior (of whom he had an abundant
choice). But I have to admit on reflection that even with
the dull, dutiful Dallas evangel, it is much more likely than
not, that 10 years from now she will be voting quite reliably
with [Justices] Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and the one or two
more generally conservative justices who George Bush will
probably have the chance to place on the court in the
remaining three-and-a-third years of his presidency.
It could have been so much more. But it is probably
enough. And in politics, when we probably get enough-
we should be thankful.
15
By the way, you should not underestimate the level of outrage
in conservative groups that their long-term plan 16 for cultivating,
promoting, and providing forums for "certain, proven" candidates
for the Supreme Court has been thwarted by a President who had
15. Tony Blankley, High Court Politics, Townhall.com, Oct. 5, 2005,
http://www.townhall.comlopinionlcolumnsltonyblankley/2005/10/05/159417.ht
ml.
16. See David D. Kirkpatrick, In Alito, G.O.P. Reaps Harvest Planted in
'82, N. Y. Times, Jan. 30, 2006, at Al.
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the chutzpah not to buy into their grooming premises and not to
chose one of their prot6g6s. Nor should you underestimate their
political power or the strong possibility that they will eventually
prevail. Time will tell.'
7
Mr. Blankley characterizes the nomination of Harriet Miers to
the Supreme Court as "politics," and politics it is. But my point is
that the politics are not simply at the nomination level but
regrettably interspersed throughout the judicial system. Therein
lies the serious challenge to judicial independence that has
characterized much of the last twenty-five years.
I. STRUCTURAL CHANGES
Thus far I have described political challenges to the Judiciary.
What I would like to do now is to talk about structural changes in
the judiciary that have been going on during the twenty-six years
that I have been a federal judge and that represent continuing
challenges to the Judiciary. The first relates to changes in the role
of the trial judge, and the second to changes in the role of the
appellate judge.
A. Changes in the District Courts
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 had as its purpose to
promote for all citizens---rich or poor, individual or corporation,
plaintiff or defendant--the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution
of civil disputes in the federal courts. The Act comments that
"[high costs, long delays and insufficient judicial resources all too
often leave this time-honored promise unfulfilled."' 8  The Act
predicts that "[b]y improving the quality of the process of civil
litigation, this legislation will contribute to improvement of the
quality of justice that the civil justice system delivers."'19 Among
other things, the Civil Justice Reform Act mandated that a civil
litigation manual for district courts be prepared, providing a
17. In the face of political pressure, Harriet Miers withdrew her nomination
for Supreme Court Justice on October 27, 2005. See Miers Withdraws Supreme
Court Nomination, CNN.com, Oct. 27, 2005, http://www.cnn.com2005/
POLITICS/10/27/miers.nominations/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
18. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
19. Id.
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"description and analysis of the litigation management, cost and
delay reduction principles and techniques, and alternative dispute
resolution programs considered most effective by the Judicial
Conference [of the United States] . . ,20 The manual was
prepared by a small panel of very experienced and able trial
judges, under the direction of the Judicial Conference. In March
2001, eleven years after the Act was passed, the result of their
efforts was presented to and approved by the Judicial Conference.
The manual is a 157-page, highly detailed manual, together with
sample forms, that was distributed to all district and magistrate
judges and made available to the public. Those of you in the
audience who plan to make your living as trial lawyers will need to
become thoroughly familiar with the manual. The case
management techniques detailed in the manual are, of course,
rooted in and driven by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Federal Rules of Evidence and have evolved over many years.
The manual lays heavy emphasis on the role of the judge in
controlling the development of a case, and every page exhorts the
judge to be actively involved in every stage of development.
In terms of what it seeks to do, the manual seems to me to be
extremely well-done and very useful. But two things, not in the
least novel, come through loud and clear. The first is that the case
management techniques that this manual details--and these are
tried and true techniques, developed over decades--are
undoubtedly designed to reduce cost and delay, but they seem
highly likely to make it very time-consuming (in terms of lawyers'
time) and very expensive (in combination with extraordinarily high
rates that lawyers now charge for their time) for the client to file
and pursue a case in federal court. For years, I have heard
comments from judges and lawyers that we are losing market share
to the state courts. One can debate whether this is good or bad, but
just looking at the manual (which captures in one place, and with
an official imprimatur, all the hoops through which a federal civil
case must go), it is not hard to identify one of the possible reasons
for this loss of market share. The second thing that is clear from
the manual is that at every stage of the development of the case,
20. 28 U.S.C. § 479(c)(3) (2000).
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heavy emphasis is laid on positioning the case so that settlement is
facilitated and trial is avoided.
Which brings me to related major structural changes that have
been underway for the last thirty years in the federal district courts
(and, as I understand it, in some state courts as well)-the
declining trial rate and the change in the role of the district judge.
In the thirty-year period from 1970 through 1999, the total number
of civil cases filed in the federal district courts rose 152%.21 In the
same time period and in spite of that increase, the number of cases
that were tried dropped by 20%.22 It is of course true that,
historically, only a relatively small number of the civil and
criminal cases filed have proceeded to trial. But during the past
thirty years, we have gone from a trial rate of 12% of civil cases
filed to the current trial rate of 3%, and the decline exists in all
categories of cases.23  On the criminal side, the trial rate has
dropped by 10%, with the greatest reduction occurring since
1989.24 The latter decline parallels an increase in convictions
obtained from guilty pleas, from 85% in 1976 to 95% in 1999.25
The common wisdom is that the increase in guilty pleas during the
last ten years or so is linked to the adoption of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 and the adoption of the Guidelines and
minimum sentencing in 1986 and 1988. Interestingly, as the trial
rate in both civil and criminal cases has declined, the percentage of
cases tried that is accounted for by jury trials, as distinguished
from bench trials, has increased substantially.
The declining trial rate in civil cases has been accompanied by
an extraordinary increase in the use of private dispute resolution
forums, such as arbitration and mediation, which divert cases from
the federal courts or, once a case is filed in federal court, are
resorted to either by agreement or by direction from the district
court. Twenty-five years ago, people who made their living as
arbitrators or mediators were few and far between. Today, we
have an army of them handling what used to be our business.
21. Compiled statistical information from the Administrative Office of
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One unfortunate side effect of the resort to private dispute
resolution is that the development of judicial precedent that
informs behavior ex ante and helps resolve cases ex post has been
impaired. Even arbitrators complain that they see legal issues
recurring in arbitrations, issues which they have addressed before
but which are not the subject of any judicial decisions and which
therefore must be addressed again and again. Thus, a process
invoked in the name of efficiency paradoxically has its own
inefficiency.
In summary, what we are seeing is flight from the system. The
reasons for this flight are many, and as we confront the problem,
they will doubtless be better understood. Clearly, the considerable
pre-trial expense resulting from our case management techniques is
one reason. To the extent that the flight is to the state courts, the
demand for lawyers who can actually try cases continues. But to
the extent that settlement or alternative dispute resolution has
become the way by which most cases get resolved, the demand for
lawyers who can actually try cases diminishes, or put another way,
the opportunity for lawyers to develop the skills and judgment
required to try a case diminishes.
As for district judges, the system now demands a judge with
highly developed management skills far more than it demands a
skilled trial judge, although the management skills obviously draw
heavily on trial experience. To the extent that a district judge fails
to be sensitive to the need in an individual case to dispense with,
fine tune, or curtail some, or perhaps many, of the case
management techniques laid out so well in the manual and, instead,
lets a case proceed on autopilot and turn into wave after expensive
wave of forms, the goals of our system--the speedy and just
resolution of disputes-will be defeated. And our customers will
vote, as they have voted, with their feet; the business will continue
to go elsewhere. Much of what will remain with us will not
require the judicial talent we have historically attracted.
But the implications for our system of justice are more
important. Article 11I and the Seventh Amendment give expression
to a fundamental tenet of our system--that even in the resolution
of civil disputes, the community, in the person of judges and juries,
has always played a central role-and the ways in which those
673
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disputes have been resolved have been visible to the public. All of
that is altered when citizens with disputes resort in ever increasing
numbers to private dispute resolution, partly because lawyers and
judges have left many of them with no feasible alternative.
Whether or under what circumstances that could be deemed a
good, bad, or simply neutral development is more than I can get to
today. But it clearly represents a substantial change in the way in
which our country has functioned. The litigant who has no feasible
alternative except to settle will sometimes reach a different result
than he would have reached after trial by a judge or a jury, and he
may be less willing to accept as just an adverse settlement result
than he would have been to accept the same result when it is the
product of a trial and the judgment of a judge or a jury of his peers.
For such a litigant, we have kept the word of promise of Article III
and the Seventh Amendment to his ear and broken it to his hope.
B. Changes in the Appellate Courts
I turn finally to changes in the role of an appellate judge that
have occurred during the last twenty-five years or so. I was
appointed to the Fifth Circuit by President Carter in 1979. My
judgeship position was part of a package of eleven positions newly
created by Congress in 1978 to deal with the burgeoning caseload
in the Fifth Circuit which then extended from Key West to El
Paso-six states in all. Congress made a judgment that the
caseload in 1978 was too heavy, far too heavy, for the fifteen
judges of that court to handle. What was that caseload? Appeals
filed in the Fifth Circuit in 1978 totaled 3,500 cases. 26  The
workload of an active judge during 1978 involved participating in
672 appeals terminated and preparing a total of 112 written
decisions.
The Fifth Circuit (with a total after 1978 of twenty-six judges)
was split by Congress in 1981 into two circuits, the Fifth
(containing the states of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi) and the
Eleventh (containing the states of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida),
largely because of a perception that a court of twenty-six judges
26. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, United States
Courts of Appeals: Workload Statistics for the Decade of the 1970's (1980)
[hereinafter Workload Statistics].
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was too unwieldy. What has happened since 1981 is that the
caseload of both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits has grown
tremendously, but only three judges have been added, all three to
the Fifth Circuit. In 2000, a total of 15,100 appeals were filed in
both circuits, to be disposed of by twenty-nine active judges.27
That compares with 3,500 appeals filed in the old, six-state Fifth
28Circuit in 1978, when Congress increased the number of judges
from fifteen to twenty-six. So we have three more judges to deal
with 11,600 more appeals. How does the per-judge workload in
the Fifth Circuit in 1978 compare with the current Fifth Circuit? In
2000, the workload of an active judge involved participating in
1,516 appeals terminated (as compared to 672 in 1978) and
preparing a total of 201 written decisions (as compared to 112 in
1978). Focusing on appeals terminated, our per-judge workload in
the twenty-two years ended in 2000 increased 126%. Remember
that Congress decided that the load in 1978 was far too heavy.
Surely a candid assessment of our situation today would be the
same. Yet, there is no move afoot or in prospect to increase the
number of judges. So where we are in terms of workload is where
we are likely to remain.
There have been two major developments in the Fifth Circuit
(and in other federal appellate courts as well) that have enhanced
our ability to handle our caseload. First, we have experienced a
substantial increase in staff. Today, our court (sixteen active
judges and two senior judges) employs fifty staff attorneys and
sixty-three elbow clerks, resulting in a total of 113 lawyers
working for the court. In 1989, the Staff Attorneys Office had only
sixteen lawyers; each judge had only three law clerks, whereas
most now have four.
Second, beginning in the 1960s, the Fifth Circuit has developed
a series of mechanisms that are designed to enable the court to
handle a steadily increasing caseload without a concomitant
increase in the number of judges. The traditional way of deciding
a case is after an oral argument in which the lawyers have an
opportunity to address the difficult issues in a case and respond to
27. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistical Tables
for the Federal Judiciary (June 30, 2000).
28. See Workload Statistics, supra note 25.
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questions from the bench. Since the 1960s, the number of cases
sent to oral argument has steadily declined to the point that in the
year 2004, only twenty-one percent of the fully briefed cases were
sent to the oral argument calendar.29 The balance of the cases was
disposed of by summary calendar panels (sixty-seven percent) or
30conference calendar panels (twelve percent). If a case has a
novel issue in it, or is complicated, or has a lengthy record, or will
likely be reversed, it is a candidate for the oral argument calendar.
Otherwise it is a candidate for the summary calendar or the
conference calendar. A case decided on the summary calendar is
decided on the record and briefs by a panel of three judges. One
judge prepares an opinion and sends the proposed opinion, along
with the record and briefs, to the second and third judges by mail.
Often the record and briefs arrive in the chambers of the first judge
accompanied by a memorandum and a draft opinion prepared by
the Staff Attorneys Office. The conference calendar is for our
easiest cases, and the principal criteria for a conference calendar
case are a limited record and a limited issue that has been
frequently decided and is well-settled. The Staff Attorneys Office
prepares a memorandum and a draft opinion on each conference
calendar case. A conference calendar panel meets every other
month for three days and disposes of a large number of cases per
day. Both the summary calendar and the conference calendar are
staff-intensive.
One other change that I would mention but cannot fully explore
today is that the case mix has changed substantially in the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits (but not necessarily in the other circuits). In
1978, thirty-nine percent of all appeals filed in the old Fifth Circuit
were direct criminal appeals and state and federal prisoner
petitions, and the remaining sixty-one percent were civil and
administrative appeals. In 2005, sixty-seven percent and fifty-
eight percent of all appeals filed in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
respectively, were direct criminal appeals and state and federal
prisoner petitions, and the remaining thirty-three percent and forty-
five percent of the appeals filed in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
29. Internal Fifth Circuit statistics (on file with author).
30. Id.
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respectively were civil and administrative appeals. The decline in
civil appeals (as a percentage of total appeals) might be expected
from what I have said about the changes occurring in the district
courts. The increase in criminal appeals and prisoner petitions is
primarily a result of increased prosecution at the federal level of
drug, immigration, and gun cases, as well as the adoption of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which was
designed to decrease prisoner petitions but which has had the
perverse effect of increasing them by putting a one-year statute of
limitations into place.
The shifting case mix plays an important role in the need, or
lack thereof, for additional judge power. To generalize (and
admitting the many frailties likely in such a generalization), many
civil appeals tend to be more judge-time intensive (and less
susceptible to help from staff attorneys) than most, though
certainly not all, criminal appeals and prisoner petitions. Those
criminal appeals and prisoner petitions that present repetitive
issues (of which the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit have droves) are
particularly well suited to the presentation to judges of memoranda
and drafts opinions by staff attorneys. In considering the request
from circuits other than the Fifth and Eleventh for additional
judgeships, Congress frequently asks why the other circuits cannot
be as efficient (i.e., handle as many appeals per judge) as the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits. Without getting into whether our
"efficiency" is wholly desirable from the standpoint of the
administration of justice, one answer to that question, I suggest,
lies in case mix, which differs considerably from circuit to another.
What has happened in the last twenty-five years or so is that
there has been a change in the function of an appellate judge. If I
had just described to you the way in which a large law firm or a
federal agency works, there would be nothing unusual about the
picture. A law firm or an agency handling a case depends on
junior lawyers to review the record and do the requisite legal
research; middle level lawyers to supervise the record review and
legal research, to review the results of both and to make a
recommendation to a senior partner on the decision to be made; a
senior partner to make a final review and to make the requisite
decision; junior and middle level lawyers to write up the decision;
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and the senior partner to fine tune it. But, to say the least, that is
not the way Learned Hand functioned.
Thirty years ago, then Justice Rehnquist made a speech to the
American Bar Association entitled "The Cult of the Robe." In that
speech he focused on the increasing number of direct criminal
appeals, but the change in the function of an appellate judge that he
identified as occurring in the way those appeals were handled is
true today, at least in the Fifth Circuit, in the way in which a much
broader group of appeals is handled:
[A]ppellate courts now process criminal appeals rather
than decide them. The sheer numbers have been thought to
require addition of staff clerks in almost all appellate
courts. But there is a subtle change in the function of the
appellate judge also; a change from the role of linesman at
a tennis match to that of an inspector on an automotive
assembly line. The tennis linesman does not start out with
any presumption that the server's service will be in or out,
he simply judges each serve on the merits. But the
assembly line inspector assumes that a part is good unless
he sees a defect in it.
The person who actually decides an appeal is an
appellate judge--the person who supervises the processing
of such appeals to decision, though he be called an
appellate judge, is really more of an administrator. Instead
of personally delving into and casting a vote on, say, ten
cases, he takes part in supervising law clerks who delve
into twenty or thirty cases, he approves what the law clerks
have done in half or two-thirds of that number, and
personally delves into and decides the remainder.
So long as the clerks and judges are capable, and they
generally are, there is no denial of justice in this system.
But the appellate judge who is one of its supervisors plays a
different role than the appellate judge of a generation ago.
The great hallmark of judges, to my mind, has always been
the idea that whatever goes out over a judge's signature,
while not necessarily composed in its entirety by him, has
at least been fully considered and understood by him. Any
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significant increase in this trend of converting judges into
administrators would jeopardize that principle of judging.3 1
In my view, which is shared by some but not all of the judges
on my court, we have gone a long way further down the road of
converting judges into administrators in the last twenty-five years
on this court. We still "personally delve into and decide" many
cases each year, the number varying from one judge to another;
but our efforts in a substantial number of the cases on our docket
consists of directly supervising law clerks or indirectly supervising
staff attorneys who delve into those cases and of approving what
they have done. We have not become administrators because any
of us is lazy; all the judges on my court work very hard, much
harder, in my view, than almost all of our peers in law practice.
We have not done so because we wanted to; most of us would be
more comfortable, that is, less worried about the accuracy and
quality of our decisions, if we did more of the spade work
ourselves. The simple fact is that we have been compelled to
become administrators of an ever-larger team of lawyers by reason
of the sheer volume of our caseload and the decision of Congress,
concurred in by a majority of the judges on our court, to limit the
number of judges on our court.
I take some comfort from Justice Rehnquist's statement that so
long as the judges and clerks are capable, and they are, there is no
denial of justice in the present system. But I am concerned that the
core principle of judging that Justice Rehnquist identified--"that
whatever goes out over a judge's signature, while not necessarily
composed in its entirety by him, has at least been fully considered
and understood by him"32-is in jeopardy today by reason of the
sheer number of matters that go out over our signatures. One of
our more experienced judges once commented to me, somewhat
cryptically, that "we now have discretionary review." I think that
this problem may have been at the heart of what he was talking
about.
31. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the





What I have described for you today is a series of major
challenges to the federal judiciary, challenges to its very identity.
The first is the financial challenge, not unique to the Judiciary, of
trying to maintain our operations, including the quality of those
operations, in an era of soaring budget deficits. The second stems
from the increasingly divisive politics that surround us and
permeate so many aspects of our lives. Those politics cause
Congressmen to attack the courts in very intemperate language
principally because of judicial decisions that they disagree with.
And those politics have invaded the appointment process for the
intermediate appellate courts to a remarkable degree, causing
people to see the role of judges differently and some judges to see
themselves and their role differently. I have described changes
occurring in the federal district courts in which more and more
litigants are using the alternate dispute resolution process to
resolve their differences, trials are declining, and judges are
becoming the managers of an ever more complex and expensive
litigation process rather than trial judges. Finally, I have described
the increasing reliance on staff that is occurring at the appellate
level as a result of soaring caseloads and an understandable
reluctance to deal with the soaring caseloads by increasing the
number of judges. Along with this has come something of an
evolution in the role of the appellate judge, in many although not
all cases, to that of an administrator or manager. I hope this has
given you something to think about, indeed something to worry
about.
680 [Vol. 66
